Socrates: Let us consider the matter in this way: if a person knows the way to Larissa, or anywhere else, and goes there, shall we call him a right and good guide? Meno: Certainly. Socrates: And a person who has a right opinion as to the way, but has never been there, may he not also be a good guide? Meno: Certainly.

Socrates: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as knowledge. And the man who has true opinion will be just as good a guide as the man who has knowledge. Meno: That appears to be true. Socrates: The right opinion is not less useful than knowledge. Meno: That is correct.

Socrates: But true opinions, so long as they stay, are a fine thing and do all sorts of good. But they are not willing to remain long. They escape from a man's mind, so they are not of much value until one ties them down by giving an account of reason. This act of tying them down is called 'recollection', and when bound, they become knowledge. Meno: I understand.

Socrates: Therefore, we must say that knowledge differs from true opinion, not in usefulness but in stability. Meno: That seems to be well put, Socrates. Socrates: Then the person who has knowledge is more stable and reliable than one with mere opinion, even if both may guide correctly.